The powers who controlled the United States didn't want the people to know their history. If the people knew their history, they would realize they must rise up.
-Leslie Marmon Silko, Almanac of the Dead
The founding fathers knew that when you dispensed with the rule of law, the inevitable outcome was injustice. Now America is becoming the thing they sought to end. -Editorial in the New York Times, March 8, 2006 In this essay I will be arguing across Indigenous communities in the Americas for philosophical convergences that emerge from cultural commonalities and for political convergences that arise from shared histories.1 These shared histories are the histories of European and Euramerican colonialisms. While each of these colonialisms has a particular valence, expressed in Western law and other forms of containment and expropriation, as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples witnesses, there is a call across the globe by Indigenous people for a recognition of the commonality of these colonialisms in their subversion of the autonomy of Indigenous communities-and by Indigenous I mean no more and no less than the Native communities that were in place when Europe invaded. Thus, the political necessity of global resistance to these ongoing colonialisms translates histories into history and compels manifestos like the declaration or this essay.
The cultural commonalities to which I refer are principally the traditional relationships of Indigenous American communities to land as the nonfungible matrix of the community, grounded in extended kinship relations that in the beginning and in the end are social not biological, though it is not only Indigenous American communities that traditionally have such a relationship. This relationship to land is the antithesis of what the West understands as property.2 I use traditional here not only to mean values and practices that existed prior to the European invasion but also values, or philosophies, that persist in the present moment as a form of resistance and in certain communities as a form of resistant praxis within the property system to that system. At the end of Federalist 10, first printed in the New York Daily Advertiser on November 22, 1787, an impassioned, one might almost say a hysterical, James Madison suggests the limits of capitalism's imagination, when he decries "[a] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project."3 Certainly the most famous and arguably the most foundational of The Federalist Papers, the urtext of U.S. constitutional theory, Federalist 10 assumes the inevitability of the "dangerous vice" of "faction" in a free society in order to "provide . . . a proper cure for it . . . by controlling its effects" (Federalist, 404) .
Federalist 10 continues: "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (ibid., 405). This definition of faction begs the question, what are "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community," or "the public good," as Federalist 10 references these interests? To which Federalist 10 answers, established property interests:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. (ibid., 405-6; italics mine) What this statement achieves with one stroke is the naturalization of the "unequal" distribution of property. Within the horizon of formative U.S. political thinking, then, inequalities in wealth are not the function of historical processes of class conflict, that is, of politics, but of individual differences in the talent for acquiring wealth. Although Federalist 10 certainly recognizes class conflict in its recognition of the political centrality of faction, it simultaneously naturalizes the classes with a theory of individual "faculties": some of us are naturally more talented or socially more disposed than others at acquiring property. And, crucially: "The protection of these faculties is the first object of Government" (ibid.). That is to say, the first object of government is to protect the interests of the propertied class, with its implicit corollary: the more property, the more protection. While Federalist 10 does not represent a teleology-Madison's railing against "wicked" schemes for the redistribution of wealth tells us that there was a call for economic justice at the time, which continues into the present moment, though barely audible in the United States-it does represent a trajectory, so that at the present moment, as we hear over and over again, the gap between the haves and the have-nots both in the United States and globally is increasing, and the United States, because of its position of economic and political power in the world, bears a large share of the responsibility for this global gap. The economist Jeffrey Sachs reports: "8 million people die each year because they are too poor to survive."4 These people die, we might conclude, as a result of a certain economic terrorism. That is, what Federalist 10 theorizes and the U.S. Constitution achieves through its fundamental naturalization of class is the severance of economic conditions from the consideration of political justice. Thus, what I am referencing as economic terrorism (conscious decisions by the so-called developed nations to regulate capital flows to their advantage) is euphemized as the "free market."
Writing in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the wake of anticolonial revolutions (a phase of the age of democratic revolutions that began in 1776), Frantz Fanon focused the issue of redistribution that Madison had tried to blur: "The fundamental confrontation which seemed to be colonialism versus anticolonialism, indeed capitalism versus socialism, is already losing its importance. What matters today, the issue which blocks the horizon, is the necessity for a redistribution of wealth. Humanity must respond to this question, or be shaken to pieces [ébranlée] by it."5 While Sachs himself identifies the crucial problem confronting the world today as one of redistribution, he can only think the solution, contradictorily enough, within the limits of capitalism's imagination (within a classic liberal discourse of the linked terms of rights, property, and individualism), within the limits of the same colonial and neocolonial institutions (Western nation-states, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and with certain qualifications, the UN) that have fostered maldistribution. Fanon, however, gestures beyond the limits of the blocked horizon:
It was commonly thought that the time had come for the world, and particularly the Third World, to choose between the capitalist system and the socialist system. The underdeveloped countries, which made use of the savage competition between the two systems in order to win their national liberation, must, however, refuse to get involved in such rivalry. The Third World must not be content to define itself in relation to values which preceded it. On the contrary, underdeveloped countries must endeavor to focus on their very own values as well as methods and style specific to them.6
Given the historic moment in which Fanon is writing, the turn to neocolonialism in the midst of the Cold War with its U.S./Soviet axis, and his own Marxist orientation, it is not surprising, though perhaps disappointing, that his Wretched of the Earth does not turn its own focus on the indigenous values and methods to which he alludes but instead returns to the socialist/capitalist binary it urges the Third World to think beyond. Nevertheless, and particularly within the post-Cold War world we inhabit, Fanon's invocation of indigenous (in the sense of homegrown) values and methods is provocative, if we want to think about the key issue of redistribution beyond the limits of capitalism's imagination, that is, if we want to think about redistribution in terms of achieving social justice for all people.
On November 12, 2004 , pointing to a Native American revolution, Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson filed the following report from Bolivia in the periodical Counterpunch:
The great anti-colonial indigenous insurrection of 1781 has haunted republican Bolivia since its founding in 1825. From their military encampment in El Alto overlooking the colonial city of La Paz, Aymara leaders Túpaj Katari and Bartolina Sisa laid siege to the ruling Spanish elite from March to October 1781. Lacking urban allies, they were ultimately unable to seize the city, yet the aspirations of that uprising have taken on new life at the beginning of the 21st century.
In October 2003, popular classes of Aymara descent living in El Alto spearheaded what became a broad-based movement to overthrow the increasingly repressive and illegitimate regime of then-President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. They too laid siege to the capital and brought it to a virtual standstill. Unlike Katari and Sisa, the latest insurgents successfully overtook the urban center, occupying all but a few blocks around Plaza Murillo where the Presidential Palace is located. Waving the Aymara flag (the wiphala) and the Bolivian flag side by side, the crowds swelled to as many as 500,000 on October 17, the day a heavily guarded Sánchez de Lozada fled to Miami. The stunning turn of events dubbed by journalists the "gas war" brought to an end the era of neoliberal domination in the country. It also confirmed that Bolivia has entered a new revolutionary moment in which indigenous actors have acquired the leading role. It is a time of great promise, but one whose outcome remains unforeseeable.
In contrast to the proletarian character of the national-popular struggles that ended the phase of military and narcodictatorships in the early 1980s, the powerful movement in 2003 displayed an indigenous centrality in synch with the current demographic, sociocultural and political realities of Bolivia, where 62% of the population claims indigenous identity, according to the 2001 census.7 I foreground this report from Bolivia on Indigenous revolution not only to suggest that the project of redistribution, the project of a just society, is not utopian, but also that it will not have its origin within capitalism's imagination. Indeed, the current Bolivian revolution in progress, emphasized by the election in 2005 of its first Indian president, Evo Morales, and his reelection in 2009 by a large majority, is a response to the neoliberal market reforms designed by Sachs in the 1980s, though it must be admitted that the Morales administration is still struggling with neoliberal structures, particularly in the area of resource extraction, and there are certainly conflicts within the Indigenous communities in Bolivia over the representativeness of Morales's party, Movimiento al Socialismo. We will, then, need to imagine this redistributive project in Native American or, more broadly, Indigenous terms.
On the one hand, the Bolivian demographic lends the situation there a specificity that is not simply reproducible throughout the Americas or in other Indigenous sites (such as Aotearoa/New Zealand and Australia). On the other hand, the Indigenous philosophy of common wealth that is driving the Bolivian situation is shared historically by Indigenous communities throughout the world, including Native Hawaiian, Alaska Native, and American Indian communities in the United States, where tribal Indians make up less than 1 percent of the population. One should also remark here vis-à-vis Fanon's temporal scheme ("The Third World must not be content to define itself in relation to values which preceded it"; my emphasis) that this Indigenous value of common wealth is far older than the value of individual wealth, of profit, that seeks to displace it.
Reflecting Indigenous views on the use of natural resources, that they must be conserved for the common good, a "good" opposed to the "public good" projected in Federalist 10, the Bolivian resistance began with a successful rebellion against the privatization of water in Cochabamba in 2000 and then spread to a demand for the nationalization of natural gas. The issue here is one of sustainability, about which historically Native American philosophies have had much to say and at its own peril the imperial West has paid no attention, as it sinks deeper into an environmental despair it barely recognizes as such, brought on by a virtually unregulated capitalist exploitation of both human and natural resources.8
In Native American vocabularies what the West terms sustainability would be better translated as balance. The Navajo word for balance (to take one example) is hozho, which is also translated as beauty, happiness, and wholeness. Anthropologist Gary Witherspoon puts it this way: "The Navajo concept of 'hozho' refers to that state of affairs where everything is in its proper place and functioning in harmonious relationship to everything else."9 The particular focus of Navajo origin narratives is gender balance. However, we should be careful not to understand gender in the Navajo context in the traditional Western terms of hierarchical opposition because Native philosophies do not work dialectically but narratively. 10 The central story that a diverse range of Indigenous cultures translate into particular forms is one of kinship, a set of reciprocal family relations extended throughout the universe. Hence, the fundamental Western opposition of nature/culture is not a category of Native thinking because extended kinship incorporates the universe into the social and thus conserves it with the same care that one practices with all one's relatives.
William Bevis puts it this way: "Native American nature is urban. The connotation to us of 'urban,' suggesting a dense complex of human variety, is closer to Native American 'nature' than is our word 'natural.' The woods, birds, animals, and humans are all 'downtown,' meaning at the center of action and power, in complex and unpredictable and various relationships. . . . Nature is part of tribe."11 Bevis implicitly reverses the Western cliché of the "noble savage": the Indian who is closer to nature than the European. On the contrary, what differentiates the Indigenous from the West in this conception is that the Native has a fuller and a more expanded, or generous, conception of the social. As noted by Santa Clara Pueblo scholar Gregory Cajete: "Most Native languages do not have a specific word for 'animals.' Rather, when animals are referred to they are called by their specific names. The fact that there are no specific generic words for animals underlines the extent to which animals were considered to interpenetrate with human life. Animals were partners of humans even when humans were abusive."12 In the Navajo language, Witherspoon points out that in Navajo, "Essential parts, as well as the earth itself, are called mother. Agricultural fields are called mother, corn is called mother, and sheep [central to Navajo lifeways at least since the eighteenth century] are called mother. These applications of the concept -ma certainly make it clear that motherhood is defined in terms of the source, sustenance, and reproduction of life" (Navajo, 16). Witherspoon thus conjectures that "mother earth," "nihima (our mother)" in Navajo (ibid., 20), "is not a metaphor but the literal ground of the notion of motherhood itself ":13 "Maybe it is the earth who is really mother, and human mothers merely resemble the earth in some ways and are not really mothers" (ibid., 21). He means not literal mothers, but the power of Native kinship terminologies may be that "they break down the distinction between the literal and the metaphoric, a distinction so fundamental to Western notions of identity,"14 which are hierarchically arranged. As Witherspoon points out, and this appears to hold throughout traditional Native thinking, "Navajo define kinship in terms of action or behavior, not in terms of substance" (Navajo, 21). Thus, kinship radiates not from a biological but from a social matrix, which at the same time that it sets limits to group identity also allows for flexibility and inclusiveness in that identity. For Navajo traditionally, kin "are differentiated kinds of mothers who give and share according to need. . . . To put it simply and concisely, true kinsmen are good mothers" (ibid., 64). In Native theory and traditional practice, kinship, virtually a universal principle of hospitality, is ideally the mechanism for an equitable distribution of resources.
I stress the "ideal" to emphasize both that what I reference here are in the first instance Native epistemologies and that I recognize there is always a problem translating theory into practice. Nevertheless, I am prepared to argue, and do argue implicitly in the case of Bolivia and the Zapatistas, that theory influences practice in profound if imperfect ways. For example, it is clear beginning with early Western accounts of Native societies that kinship was a redistributive practice in terms of both economic and social power substantially different from Western social formations subsumed in the structure of the nation-state. Thus, even as Western social formations penetrated, with increasing violence, Native societies, resistance organized itself, as it still does, around traditional practices of kinship. And by "tradition," I intend, following Marshall Sahlins, a dynamic mode of adapting cultural change to certain enduring values. 15 At the center of Native philosophies and practices of kinship is an idea of land that is the antithesis in theory and practice of the Western idea of property. "Over and against the property relation to land, which comprehends land as a commodity, marketable, or alienable, by an individual or an entity acting as an individual, such as a corporation, I can best describe the traditional Native American conception of land as the inalienable ground of the communal, defined exclusively in terms of extended kinship relations."16 Acoma poet Simon Ortiz writes:
The land. The people. They are in relation to each other. We are a family with each other. The land has worked with us. And the people have worked with it. 17 In reference to the Hawaiian situation, scholar, critic, and activist HaunaniKay Trask describes the kinship between all Native lands and all Native peoples this way: "The people cannot exist without the land, and the land cannot exist without the people."18 Both Trask and Ortiz phrase this central relationship of land and people in terms of the collective. For the Indigenous person, identity is not located within the individual but flows in the relations between persons, making the "we" not the "I" the central form of recognition. This Indigenous, or kinship-based, relationship to land, which is antithetical to dominant Western ideas of social and economic life, increasingly stressing privatization, presupposes democratic forms of governance, based in consensus, that are antithetical to the representational governmental forms of Western capitalist democracies, located as they are in a majoritarian notion of power within which minority rights are formally but not necessarily substantively recognized. In Indigenous thinking, there are neither majorities nor minorities; there is only the collective. Taiaiake Alfred interprets the difference between Western and Native forms of governance in the following way:
The Native concept of governance is based on what the great student of indigenous societies, Russell Barish, has called "primacy of conscience." There is no central or coercive authority, and decision-making is collective. Leaders rely on their persuasive abilities to achieve a consensus that respects the autonomy of individuals, each of whom is free to dissent from and remain unaffected by the collective decision. The clan or family is the basic unit of social organization, and larger forms of organization from tribe through nation to confederacy, are all predicated on the political autonomy and economic independence of clan units through family-based control of lands and resources. . . . The indigenous tradition sees government as the collective power of the individual members of the nation; there is no separation between society and state. . . . By contrast, in the European tradition power is surrendered to the representatives of the majority, whose decisions on what they think is the collective good are then imposed on all citizens. 19 Alfred's model implicitly urges us to imagine political formations other than the nation-state. For if the United States specifically and the developed world more broadly wants to move beyond the limits of capitalism's imagination and its current destructive form of neoliberal globalization, a particular moment in the history of the modern nation-state, which began its trajectory with the European invasion of the Americas in 1492, then this Westernized world must begin to think seriously in terms of the philosophies that were providing balanced models of social life when unbalanced Europeans arrived violently more than five hundred years ago. Again, I turn to Alfred: In fact, it is one of the strongest themes within Native American cultures that the modern colonial state could not only build a framework for coexistence but cure many of its own ills by understanding and respecting traditional Native teachings. Pre-contact indigenous societies developed regimes of conscience and justice that promoted harmonious coexistence of humans and nature for hundreds of generations. As we move into a post-imperial age, the values central to those traditional cultures are the indigenous contribution to the reconstruction of a just and harmonious world. 20 In discussing Indigenous ideas of social relations as expressed in kinship and the way these kinship relations project a consensual model of governance, the question arises: where do we find such a model in practice today? Certainly not in the official tribal political structures of Native North America, where, as Alfred remarks, "The imposition of electoral politics in place of consensual models, and the emulation of Western politicians, has made Native politics just as much a matter of cynical manipulation of power as any other kind."21 There is no doubt that four hundred years of ongoing Euramerican colonialism has transformed Indigenous social formations based in consensus through kinship into satellites of the federal government in both Canada and the United States and at the same time has created conflicts between grassroots groups espousing traditional values and their tribal governments trying to maximize radically limited resources, which are under the ultimate control of the colonial state.
In the United States, this control is exerted through the institutions of federal Indian law, vesting "plenary power" over "Indian country" in Congress, which channels this power administratively through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, located in the U.S. Department of the Interior since 1849. Within this legal system, the federal government holds title in "trust" to all land in "Indian country" (approximately fifty-three million acres), composed of tribal and allotted lands in the lower forty-eight states and, since 1831, has defined the tribes, oxymoronically, as "domestic dependent nations," thus creating the 334 federally recognized tribes in the lower forty-eight states as minors before the law. While in 1924 a congressional act conferred citizenship by fiat on all Indians, the colonial status of the tribes remains in place, thus compromising that citizenship and giving to the term postcolonialism a uniquely ironic meaning in Indian country. Needless to say, the fractures within and between Native communities created by U.S. colonialism, coupled with the relatively small number of Indians in the U.S. population, have made political resistance from the end of the nineteenth century to the present problematic at best, though the very persistence of the tribes in the face of both historic genocide and enormous federal policy pressures to assimilate speaks to the creative resilience of Indigenous communities.
Nevertheless, in the face of U.S. colonial power, pan-tribal resistance is fragmented at best. Just how fragmented is suggested by an editorial in Indian Country Today, the largest-circulation Native newspaper in the United States. Commenting on the patently unjust federal court decisions in two crucial land dispute cases in New York State, one between the Cayuga tribe and the state and the other between the Oneida tribe and the city of Sherrill, the editors remark: "Every Native nation in New York has failed miserably at strengthening its collective hand versus the state, choosing mostly to go it alone, to pursue self-interest primarily, to fight each other constantly for positioning and turf and to decimate each other's political moves and personal reputations at every opportunity. Indian disunity in New York is presently so pervasive that even the bitter enemies of Indian sovereignty are perplexed by it all."22 While North American demographics coupled with the way U.S. and Canadian colonialism have organized the tribes politically into federal systems in capitalist democracies has made political resistance difficult, in South America, different demographics and political histories present another story, as we can see in the case of Bolivian Indigenous resistance resulting in the election of Morales.
Another case in point of Indigenous resistance to capitalism's imagination in the south-indeed, the first such case in the contemporary moment of globalization, and one that elaborates a theory for its practice-is the ongoing Zapatista revolt in Chiapas, Mexico, begun on January 1, 1994, in the wake of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement and pitting significant collectives of Mexican Indians against the state of Mexico. In their most recent manifesto, the "Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle," the Zapatistas, in prose that is Whitmanesque in the cataloguing rhythms of its appeal to democracy, give a narrative of the movement that interweaves history and theory in a mode we might call "critical storytelling." Included in this narrative is a section describing the establishment of consensual governance in 2001 in the municipali-ties under Zapatista control following the failure of the 1996 San Andrés Accords, which "were . . . going to recognize and respect the rights and culture of the Indian peoples [los pueblos indios] of Mexico, and to make everything law in the Constitution":23
We saw quite clearly that there was no point to dialogue and negotiation with the bad governments of Mexico. It was a waste of time for us to be talking with the politicians, because neither their hearts nor their words were honest. And so the political class not only closed the door-one more time-on the Indian peoples, they also delivered a mortal blow to the peaceful resolutionthrough dialogue and negotiation-to the war. We can no longer believe that agreements will be respected.
When we saw that the government was not going to keep its word we wondered in our hearts what we were going to do.
The first thing we saw was that our heart was not the same as before, when we began our struggle. It was larger, because now we had touched the hearts of many good people. And we also saw that our heart was more hurt; it was more wounded. It was not wounded by the deceits of the bad governments, but because, when we touched the hearts of others, we also touched their sorrows. It was as if we were seeing ourselves in a mirror. . . . We began to encourage the autonomous rebel Zapatista municipalities-which is how the people are organized in order to govern and to govern themselves-in order to make themselves stronger. This method of autonomous government was not simply invented by the EZLN [the military wing of the Zapatistas]; it comes from several centuries of indigenous resistance and from the Zapatistas' own experience. It is the self-governance of the communities. In other words, no one from outside comes to govern, but the peoples themselves decide, among themselves, who governs and how. . . . If you look at one of the government-sponsored studies, you will see the only indigenous communities that have improved their living conditions . . . were those in Zapatista territory. ("Declaration," 75-79, 85) Zapatista philosophy interweaves Marxist and Indigenous values in a critique of capitalism's designs on the world, which the Zapatistas reference in the typical parlance of the Left as "neoliberal globalization":
Neoliberal globalization is a war of conquest of the entire world, a world war, a war being waged by capitalism for global domination. Sometimes that conquest is by armies who invade a country and conquer it by force. But sometimes . . . the big capitalists put their money into another country or they lend it money, but on the condition that what they tell them to do is obeyed.
They also spread their ideas and their capitalist culture, which is the culture of merchandise, of profits, of the market. (ibid., 99) This is the culture of what Karl Marx terms "commodity fetishism," which the Zapatistas narrate in the following way:
From an Indigenous perspective, we can understand commodity fetishism as the displacement of kinship relations by object relations, particularly in the severance of kinship ties between consumer and producer, the latter being assimilated into the object consumed. Commodity fetishism, the heart of capitalism, is cannibalism. What, then, is the West's historic imputation of cannibalism to the Indigenous (archetypal rationalization for the category "savage") but a projection of its own exploitative socioeconomic relations?
In response to the cannibalistic war of globalization waged by neoliberal capitalism, the Zapatistas see "a globalization of rebellion":
Not just the workers of the countryside and of the city appear in this globalization of rebellion. Others also appear who are much persecuted and despised for the same reason, for not letting themselves be dominated, like women, young people, the indigenous, homosexuals, lesbians, transsexual persons, migrants and many other groups who exist all over the world but who we do not see until they shout ya basta, enough of being despised. Then they rise up, and we see them, we hear them, and we learn from them. (ibid., 103) This global rebellion, we might say, struggles to reestablish kinship relations where commodity relations have taken hold.
In 1991, Laguna Pueblo writer Leslie Marmon Silko published her novel of Indigenous-led revolution of the dispossessed in the Americas, Almanac of the Dead. Written three years before the Zapatista armed resistance to globalization began, the novel was prescient in its projection of that moment and is uncompromising in its understanding of the historical conditions for Indigenous revolution:
There was not, and there had never been, a legal government by Europeans anywhere in the Americas. Not by any definition, not even by the Europeans' own definitions and laws. Because no legal government could be established on stolen land. Because stolen land never had clear title . . . . War had been declared the first day the Spaniards set foot on Native American soil, and the same war had been going on ever since: the war was for the continents called the Americas. 24 Like the Zapatista manifesto, Almanac of the Dead works in the space where Marxism and Indigenous philosophy bear a certain relationship to each other, however vexed, because although "Marx has been right about a great many things . . . [he] had also been a European, and he and those following after him had understood the possibilities of communal consciousness only imperfectly. European communism had been spoiled, dirtied with the blood of millions. The people of the Americas had no use for European communism" (Almanac, 291). Nevertheless, Silko's character Angelita La Escapía, "colonel in the Army of Justice and Redistribution" (ibid., 309), labors to bring Marx into kinship with Indigenous thinking.
On the one hand, the tie is blatant, as La Escapía remarks: "Marx stole his ideas from us, the Native Americans" (ibid., 311): "Commune and communal were words that described the lives of many tribes and their own people as well. The mountain villages shared the land, water, and wild game. What was grown, what was caught or raised or discovered, was divided equally and shared all around" (ibid., 314). Nevertheless, "Marxism had a bleak future on American shores. Irreparable harm had been done by the immense crimes of his followers, Stalin and Mao. To the indigenous peoples of the Americas, no crime was worse than to allow some human beings to starve while others ate, especially not one's own sisters and brothers. With the deaths of millions by starvation, Stalin and Mao had each committed the sin that was unforgivable" (ibid., 316). However, "Marx and Engels could not be blamed for Mao or Stalin or Sendero any more than Jesus and Muhammed could be blamed for Hitler" (ibid.). So, on the other hand, La Escapía finds in Marx a kind of Indigenous storyteller:
The stories of the people or their "history" had always been sacred, the source of their entire existence. If the people had not retold the stories, or if the stories had somehow been lost, then the people were lost; the ancestors' spirits were summoned by the stories. This man Marx had understood that the stories or "histories" are sacred; that within "history" reside relentless forces, powerful spirits, vengeful, relentlessly seeking justice. . . . Angelita La Escapía imagined Marx as a storyteller who worked feverishly to gather together a magical assembly of stories to cure the suffering and evils of the world by the retelling of the stories. Stories of depravity were the driving force of the revolution. (ibid., And at their heart these stories continually raise and answer the question, what is a just society? Here, at the end of the story I have been telling you, then, is La Escapía's answer to that question:
Marx had been inspired by reading about certain Native American communal societies, though naturally as a European he had misunderstood a great deal. Marx had learned about societies in which everyone ate or everyone starved together, and no one being stood above another-all stood side by side-rock, insect, human being, river, or flower. Each depended upon the other; the destruction of one harmed all others.
Marx understood what tribal people had always known: the maker of a thing pressed part of herself or himself into each object made. Some spark of life or energy went from the maker into even the most ordinary objects. Marx had understood the value of anything came from the hands of the maker. Marx of the Jews, tribal people of the desert, Marx the tribal man understood that nothing personal or individual mattered because no individual survived without others. Generation after generation, individuals were born, then after eighty years, disappeared into dust, but in the stories, the people live on in the imaginations and hearts of their descendants. Wherever their stories were told, the spirits of the ancestors were present and their power was alive. (ibid., Finally, then, let me offer what is perhaps a provocation: the dominant Western story of "America"-the master narrative of equal opportunity and justice based in free enterprise-has reached its limit and exhausted itself, an exhaustion marked by the increasing distance of its narrative from reality. This story has always confused capitalism with democracy, when in fact the two systems are fundamentally at odds. In this story, we, the people, say we care for each other; the model is one of Christian charity, but the gesture is one of pseudo-kinship. For history tells us we do not care for each other (a relatively few of us eat while many of us starve). We, the people, live today in a one-party state, an oligarchy (we do not stand side by side), where what we call "democracy" or "individualism" has become an alibi for various forms of exploitation, which fit under the heading of empire. So here at this juncture of history, we are in desperate need of another story, one that answers the question, what is a just society?, one of kinship, of the kind that has been told in Native American societies for thousands of years.
Notes
I want to thank Shari Huhndorf for some of the language used here.
1 In this essay, except in a couple of instances, I have throughout capitalized the word Indigenous used as either a noun or an adjective. I do this to give the word the force of a proper noun, an emphasis that one reads more and more, particularly, I think, in the wake of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ratified by the General Assembly in 2007. At the same time, as is evidenced in this volume, the capitalization of Indigenous is not a uniform practice, some people preferring to use the term with the traditional lowercase spelling. However, I think it would be a mistake to read into these choices any differences in political perspective. That is, all the essays in this volume, whether or not they capitalize the word I(i)ndigenous, are positioned in an anticolonial framework, where the term itself denotes a historical and geopolitical primacy come under fire since 1492 with the invasion of I(i)ndigenous space by European and Euramerican imperialism. Because my examples of Indigenous thinking come from Native American philosophies, the reader will notice that at certain points I use Native (also capitalized to refer to Native Americans, a common practice in Native American studies) and Indigenous interchangeably. This of course references the fact that Native Americans are Indigenous peoples. But it also suggests that Native American philosophies can be understood in the global context of Indigeneity as inscribed in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
